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Abstract 
This study investigates the effects of an R&D subsidy scheme on participating firms’ net R&D 
investment. Making use of a specific policy design in Belgium that explicitly distinguishes 
between research and development grants, we estimate direct and cross-scheme effects on research 
versus development intensities in recipients firms. We find positive direct effects from research 
(development) subsidies on net research (development) spending. This direct effect is larger for 
research grants than for development grants. We also find cross-scheme effects that may arise due 
to complementarity between research and development activities. Finally, we find that the 
magnitude of the treatment effects depends on firm size and age and that there is a minimum 
effective grant size, especially for research projects. The results support the view that public 
subsidies induce higher additional investment particularly in research where market failures are 
larger, even when the subsidies are targeting development.    
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1. Introduction 
By now, a wide literature has investigated the effects of public subsidies on private R&D. Although 
this literature provides substantial evidence that subsidies are an effective tool to trigger additional 
R&D in the private sector1, it is an open question at which stage of the R&D process such policy 
is most effective. R&D grants affect two related, but distinct activities, namely research (‘R’) and 
development (‘D’). Research activities show fundamentally different characteristics from 
development activities, as research typically relates to more tacit knowledge, higher intangibility, 
higher outcome uncertainty and further market distance. These different characteristics may also 
explain different financing constraints, which are more binding for research than for development 
projects (Czarnitzki et al. 2011). As research typically involves early-stage activities with a wider 
set of possible applications, lower appropriability, and hence, higher knowledge spillovers, higher 
social returns are usually attributed to research than to development activities. These expected 
social returns related to research are usually used to make a bigger case for subsidizing research 
compared to development projects.  
Previous studies on the impact of R&D subsidies generally do not distinguish between 
research and development. Partly, this is due to a lack of access to information on the nature of the 
project for which the subsidy was received as well as on how much private money firms spend on 
each of these activities. A study on Norwegian innovation policy by Clausen (2009) constitutes an 
exception. Clausen applies a taxonomy that distinguishes between projects that are “close to the 
market” and projects that are “far from the market”. The author finds that while subsidies received 
for projects far from the market stimulate additional research spending, subsidies received for 
projects close to the market rather substitute firms’ own spending on development. These results 
suggest that the extent to which public co-funding of R&D projects induces additional investments 
depends on the type of project. However, this study’s classification of R&D subsidies is based on 
a taxonomy defined by the author, not by the policy design of the program under review. 
                                                 
1 See for instance Hall and Maffioli (2008) who examine the literature on crowding-out effects since 2000. They find 
that most studies reject the null hypothesis of total crowding out of private R&D investments, with the exception of 
Wallsten (2000), analyzing the SBIR program in the United States who found dollar per dollar crowding-out effects. 
For recent studies on the effect of subsidies in Flanders, see for instance Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento (2013) and 
Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento (2014). 
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The analysis presented in this paper investigates a project-based innovation policy 
implemented in the Belgian region of Flanders, which explicitly provides different schemes for 
research projects and development projects. Using data on all publicly co-financed projects, we 
are able to match the subsidy information with survey data that includes information on firms’ own 
investment split in research and development. We study the period 2000 to 2009 in which during 
the first five years mainly mixed projects had been co-funded, while more recently, the policy has 
shifted to mainly support research and development projects separately. This unique dataset allows 
us to study direct as well as cross-scheme effects of such a targeted subsidy program.  
Our analysis contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, the ability to 
distinguish research from development grants allows us to assess the direct effects from research 
grants on research expenditures and from development grants on development expenditures. 
Second, we measure cross-scheme effects, assessing whether we find evidence for effects from 
research (development) grants on development (research) expenditures. Third, as we have 
information on the amount of subsidies received, both own as well as cross effects are measured 
on “net” expenditures. That means that our analysis not only detects evidence for full crowding-
out as done primarily in the literature, but we can also draw conclusions on partial crowding out. 
Furthermore, we are able to estimate dose response functions that allow drawing conclusions on 
the elasticity of private R and D investments to public support depending on grant size. Finally, 
we investigate the heterogeneity in direct and cross additionality effects across recipient firms.    
The results from a series of treatment effects models show that research subsidies induce 
additional net private research expenditures. In addition, research subsidies also generate 
significant positive cross-effects on development expenditures. For development subsidies, the 
direct effect on net private development investment is weaker, but we do find that development 
grants trigger significant additional research spending. While we find the elasticity of R and D to 
be positive for the mean amount of public money received, we find – especially for research grants 
– that the elasticity varies with grant size. Moreover, we find heterogeneity in the size of the 
treatment effect depending on firm size and age.  
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 and 3 briefly describes the policy under review and 
the distinction between R and D schemes and present our hypotheses. Section 4 sets out the 
econometric framework and the data. Section 5 presents the results and section 6 concludes. 
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2. The policy design - Why distinct subsidy schemes? 
R&D projects comprise different types of activities. Basic research primarily aims at acquiring 
new knowledge not necessarily with its application in mind, while applied research is an activity 
directed towards a specific application objective. Development draws from existing research 
results and aims at the creation and implementation of new and improved products and processes. 
Following the definition of the OECD Frascati Manual, research projects can be characterized by 
a high degree of outcome uncertainty and by being ‘far from the market’ without targeting 
commercialization opportunities directly. Research projects, however, create the foundations for 
future development projects (see e.g. Mansfield et al. 1971). Because research involves early stage 
technologies, the new knowledge is often tacit and therefore more difficult to fully appropriate by 
the creator of the knowledge (Arrow, 1962; Usher, 1964). Thus, economic theory suggests that the 
difference between social rates of returns and private ones is larger for research activities because 
of higher spillovers and hence, lower appropriability. Development projects, on the contrary, aim 
at commercializing inventions. As the development trajectory is more focused and often more 
incremental, it is less prone to spillovers when compared to research. Development outcomes may 
also be more tangible if firms protect their “close to the market”- innovations through formal and 
informal IP strategies (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002). Because development projects are closer 
to the actual implementation of an invention or the introduction of a new product to the market, 
firms may appropriate the returns more easily. 
Beyond differences in spillovers and appropriability, research and development activities are 
different in their risk and uncertainty profile. Karlsson et al. (2004) promote the idea that research 
is a more discontinuous process, which may or may not result in solutions whereas development 
is a more continuous search for solutions to an existing set of ideas. Such differences in risk and 
uncertainty translate into different sensitivities of research versus development investments to 
imperfections in the financial markets. Czarnitzki et al. (2011) find for a sample of Flemish firms 
that research investments are much more dependent on firms’ internal financial resources 
compared to development projects.  
Given this heterogeneity of activities within the R&D process, it seems reasonable for policy 
makers to consider these specificities when designing innovation policy tools. With higher 
spillovers, more difficult appropriation and constrained access to external finance for research 
activities, the market failures for research is likely to be larger than for development activities. 
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Research projects may therefore justify a higher subsidy rate, i.e. the share of total project costs 
covered by the grant. Moreover, a distinct scheme may allow applying different selection criteria 
for research projects than for development projects, taking the specificities of research in terms of 
risk, duration and expected outcomes into account.  
 
The Flemish R and D policy 
Flanders, like many industrialized economies, has project-based R&D subsidy programs in place. 
The Flemish funding agency (IWT), an independent government body, administers the 
permanently open and non-thematic R&D subsidy scheme. Any firm located in Flanders may 
submit a project in any technological field at any time of the year. An external board of referees 
evaluates the applications and decides whether the project is eligible for funding. 
Over the past decade, the Flemish innovation policy moved its focus towards distinct grants 
for ‘R’ and ‘D’ projects that do not only differ in terms of the projects’ focus, but also with respect 
to the share in total project costs borne by the funding agency. The share of cost covered by the 
government varies for industrial ‘basic and strategic’ research, ‘experimental development, and 
prototyping’ and so-called ‘mixed projects’. For research projects, the base rate is about 50% and 
it is 25% for development. In both schemes, an additional 10% may be granted to medium sized 
firms and an extra 20% to small firms. Collaborative projects may receive another additional 10%. 
The minimum project size is one hundred thousand euros and the subsidy is capped at 3 million 
euros per project.2 
As can be seen in Figure 1, since 1997 an increasing number of firms participated in the 
Flemish subsidy scheme and the total amount of funding more than doubled during this period. 
From 1997 to 2009, the Flemish government co-funded a total number of 2,872 projects in 1,868 
different firms. While the average size of the government’s contribution per project remained 
rather constant over time, the overall number of co-funded projects doubled. Table 1 summarizes 
the key characteristics of the subsidy-schemes for the funding periods 1997-2009. These numbers 
are at the annualized project (not firm) level and the amounts refer to the government’s share in 
                                                 
2 See http://www.iwt.be/english/funding/subsidy/industrial-projects. 
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total project costs. Among subsidized firms, each firm has on average 1.4 running projects in a 
given year and receives a payment of 175 thousand euros (median = 53).   
 
Figures 1 and 2: Evolution of participation in the subsidy program and grants by type of 
scheme at the project level (amounts in T Euros) 
  
 
 
 
Table 1: Co-financed R&D projects in the Flemish innovation policy design 1997 -2009 
(4,827 obs.) 
 mean std. dev. min max
Projects per firm 1.420 1.514 1 24
Research grant (amt. yearly) 32.647 172.977 0 6,360.925
Development grant  (amt. yearly) 49.425 204.339 0 6,706.612
Mixed grant  (amt. yearly) 90.353 382.030 0 7,526.763
Average yearly amount 175.149  578.673 0 14,637.96
Note: Share among all granted projects. Source: IWT ICAROS data base. Yearly amount in thousand Euros and at 
the project-year level.  
 
As can be gathered from Figure 2, the dominating tendency of the Flemish funding agency 
moved away from mixed R&D projects for which no clear priorities on the stage of the R&D 
process are set a-priori towards specific programs (i.e. either R or D). Indeed, while the yearly 
amount spent by project did not change over the years, as shown by Figure 2, one can see that until 
the early 2000’s mixed projects accounted for the lion’s share among all grants. By 2005 mixed 
projects had been overtaken by pure development grants and by pure research grants in terms of 
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their share in total granted projects. With this shift towards a more targeted approach, it is 
interesting to study to what extent a research or development grant triggers additional research and 
development investments by the recipient firms, whether there are differences in terms of efficacy 
between both schemes and whether there are any cross scheme effects.  
3. Direct and cross additionality effects from R and D subsidies on 
R and D expenditures 
Based on previous findings that have repeatedly shown positive additionality of R&D subsidies 
on R&D spending in Flanders (see eg Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento (2013) and Hottenrott and 
Lopes-Bento (2014)), we expect to also find positive own additionality from R and D grants.   
H1:The direct effects from research subsidies on research expenditures are positive. 
H2:The direct effects from development subsidies on development expenditures are positive. 
 
Based on the arguments in section two, as research investments may be more constrained 
compared to development investments, we expect the direct effects of a research grant to be larger 
than the direct effect of a development grant leading to  
H3:The direct effects from research subsidies on research expenditures are larger than the direct 
effects of development grants on development spending. 
 
In addition to direct effects, there might also be cross-effects across schemes. That is, recipients of 
research (development) grants may also invest more in development (research) in response to the 
subsidy. The reasoning that leads us to expect positive cross effects starts from the premise that 
research and development activities influence the expected returns to innovation differently. The 
productivity of knowledge, i.e. a firm’s effective knowledge base, creating innovative products 
and processes, results from the interaction between research and development activities. 
Development is specific to the firm’s business and, hence, necessary to develop an effective 
knowledge base that serves to improve the firm's position. Research on the other hand serves to 
improve the efficiency of development. In order to better understand how to conduct development, 
firms need to do research. Quoting Rosenberg (1990): "A basic research capability is essential for 
evaluating the outcome of much applied research for perceiving its possible implications..."  
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Therefore, research can be regarded to be complementary to development. Several explanations as 
to the exact mechanisms for establishing a complementary relationship between research and 
development have been suggested in the literature (Nelson; 1959; Evenson and Kislev, 1975; 
Cassiman et al., 2002). As research provides a codified form of problem-solving, it can increase 
the efficiency of development activities (Arrow, 1962). In addition, research know-how serves as 
a map for technological landscapes guiding development in the direction of most promising 
technological venues avoiding thereby wasteful experimentation (Fleming and Sorenson, 2004). 
A better and more fundamental understanding of the technology landscape encourages non-local 
search for improving technologies as opposed to local search, leading to the exploration of more 
diverse development projects. In addition, research know-how leads to a better identification, 
absorption and integration of external (public) knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; 
Gambardella, 1995; Cockburn and Henderson, 1998; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006). Faster 
identification, absorption, and integration of external knowledge in turn lead to increased 
productivity of the development process (Fabrizio, 2009; Cassiman et al., 2008).  
Although in the short run, research and development activities can be seen as substitutes 
competing for available fixed resources, in the long-run when resources are not fixed, research and 
development activities complement each other as outlined above. When research and development 
activities are complementary, the marginal returns of research increase with higher spending on 
development and vice versa. A consequence of a complementary relationship between research 
and development activities is that the cross effects from subsidies are positive, i.e. a higher subsidy 
for research will not only stimulate research expenditures, but also, because of the induced higher 
marginal returns from development with higher research expenditures, research subsidies will also 
stimulate development expenditures and vice versa: development subsidies will also increase the 
marginal returns from research and therefore stimulate research expenditures. Firms that are more 
efficient in doing research, are more likely to have bigger cross effects, to such an extent that 
research subsidies could be even more powerful instruments to stimulate development than 
development subsidies.  
In line with the above reasoning, we further hypothesize that  
H4:The cross effects from research subsidies on development expenditures are positive and the 
cross effects from development subsidies on research expenditures are positive.  
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4. Empirical strategy 
The analysis of direct and cross additionality is pursued in three steps. First, we estimate direct 
average treatment effects as well as cross-scheme average treatment effects using a nearest-
neighbor propensity score matching procedure. IV regressions serve as robustness check taking  
potential selection on unobservables into account. Second, we make use of the detailed information 
on the size of the individual grants to estimate the impact of different levels of treatment, 
employing a generalized propensity score (GPS) method to estimate dose response functions 
(DRF). Finally, we we try to disentangle the factors driving the direct and/or cross effects by 
analyzing the heterogeneity of these effects in light of relevant firm characteristics. 
 
a) Treatment effects estimation 
The average treatment effect on the treated is estimated by the econometric matching estimator. 
The econometric matching estimator directly addresses the question of “How much would a treated 
firm have invested in R or D if it had not received a subsidy?" Given that the counterfactual 
situation is not observable, it has to be approximated through an estimation procedure. In order to 
do so, we employ a nearest neighbor propensity score matching. That is, we pair each subsidy 
recipient with a non-recipient firm by choosing nearest “twins” based on their similarity in the 
estimated probability of receiving such a subsidy. The estimated probability stems from a probit 
estimation on binary variables indicating the receipt of a subsidy Sr or Sd, controlling for any 
observable characteristics able to drive the selection into the respective funding scheme. This 
setting thus allows us to take into account that subsidies (as well as the different type of grant) are 
not randomly distributed, but are subject to selection. Looking for the single most similar firm, the 
matching estimator accounts for this selection, and after having paired each treated firm with the 
most similar non treated firm, we can assume that any remaining differences can be attributed to 
the policy effect. In addition to the similarity in the propensity score, we further require firms in 
the selected control group to belong to the same industry and to be observed in the same year as 
the firms in the treatment group.3 
In order for the matching estimator to be valid, the conditional independence assumption 
(CIA) has to hold (Rubin, 1977). In other words, in order to overcome the selection problem, 
                                                 
3 For the detailed matching protocol, see Table A.1 in Appendix 1. 
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participation and potential outcome have to be independent for individuals with the same set of 
exogenous characteristics X. Thus, the critical assumption using the matching approach is to 
observe all  factors determining the entry into the program. If this assumption holds, the average 
treatment effect on the treated firms can be represented as follows: 
 
ߙ்் ൌ 	 ଵே೅ ∑ ൫ ௜்ܻ െ ෠ܻ௜௖൯ே
೅
௜ୀଵ         (1) 
where YiT  indicates the outcome of treated firms and ෠ܻ௜௖		the counterfactual situation, i.e. the 
potential outcome which would have been realized if the treatment group (S=1) had not been 
treated. In other words, for the untreated firms, ܻ෠௜௖ corresponds to their internal R&D expenditures. 
S ߳	ሼ0,1ሽ indicates the receipt of a subsidy and NT the number of treated firms.  
Given that we have several treatments, we will estimate different treatment effects. More 
precisely, we distinguish five treatment effects:  
(i) the effect from any subsidy received on overall R&D expenditures (this treatment 
comprises all subsidy types: mixed, research and development grants provided by the 
Flemish funding agency),  
(ii) the direct effect from an ‘R’ grant on ‘R’ expenditures,  
(iii) the cross effect from an ‘R’ grant on ‘D’ expenditures,  
(iv) the cross effect from a ‘D’ grant on ‘R’ expenditures  
(v) the direct effect from a ‘D’ grant on ‘D’ expenditures.   
 
i. ߙ்்_௔௡௬_ோ&஽ ൌ ଵே೅_ೃ&ವ 	∑ ሺ పܻ
்ೃ&ವ െ෣ேୀ்௜ୀଵ పܻ஼෢ሻ       (2) 
ii. ߙ்்_ௌ௥_ோ ൌ ଵே೅_ೃ 	∑ ሺ ప்ܻ _ோ െ෣ேୀ்௜ୀଵ పܻ஼෢ሻ        (3) 
iii. ߙ்்_ௌ௥_஽ ൌ ଵே೅_ೃ 	∑ ሺ ప்ܻ _஽ െ෣ேୀ்௜ୀଵ పܻ஼෢ሻ       (4) 
iv. ߙ்்_ௌௗ_ோ ൌ ଵே೅_ವ 	∑ ሺ ప்ܻ _஽ െ෣ேୀ்௜ୀଵ పܻ஼෢ሻ       (5) 
v. ߙ்்_ௌௗ_஽ ൌ ଵே೅_ವ 	∑ ሺ ప்ܻ _ோ െ෣ேୀ்௜ୀଵ పܻ஼෢ሻ       (6) 
  
It is important to note that the control group is always adapted to the treatment. That is, we always 
define the control group in such a way that it is exclusively composed of unsubsidized firms. 
Concretely, this means that if we consider research as a treatment effect, for instance, we drop 
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firms that have received a development grant, a mixed grant or a grant from any other (Belgian or 
non-Belgian) funding agency from the control group. 
 
b) Impact of the amount of the treatment  
In a second step , we incorporate the level of subsidies in a treatment effects analysis using a 
generalized propensity score to estimate a dose response function. While most evaluation studies 
on R&D subsidies limit themselves to estimating the average treatment effect based on a binary 
treatment variable, we take the grant size, i.e. the amount distributed via the subsidy scheme, into 
account. We follow Hirano and Imbens (2004) who developed a generalization of the propensity 
score matching for the case of continuous treatments. The generalized propensity score (GPS) is 
defined as 
( , )GPS r T X   (7) 
with Ti being the treatment level and Xi a vector of pretreatment covariates. Thus, the GPS can be 
estimated as in the binary treatment case by maximum likelihood (ML) estimation. We can then 
model the conditional expected outcome and derive the treatment-specific dose response function 
(DRF) on net research and net development expenditures as a function of T and GPS.4  
2
0 1 2 3
[ ( | , )] = ( , ; )
                         = 
i i i i i
i i i i
E Y T GPS T GPS
T T T GPS
  
            (8) 
 For obtaining the DRF, we average the estimated conditional expectation 
( , ) ( | , )t r E Y T t GPS r     over the GPS for all levels of the treatment distribution5: 
 ( ) [ , ( , ) ]t E t r t X      (9) 
 
c) Heterogeneity of the direct and cross effects across firms 
Finally, we study the individually estimated treatment effects to explore the heterogeneity of 
treatment effects across firms. In order to do so, we derive the estimated treatment effects ߙ௜∗்் at 
the firm level as: 
ߙ௜் ்∗ ൌ ௜ܻ െ	 ෠ܻ௜௖	                 (10) 
                                                 
4 See Bia and Mattei (2008) for the technical details and Bia et al. (2011) for an application to R&D subsidies. 
5 Note that we bootstrap standard errors in this step with 200 replications. 
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This individual treatment effect is simply the deviation of the treated firms’ net expenditures on 
research or development from those of its matched twin. Based on this individual effect, we 
analyze whether certain firm characteristics explain direct and / or cross effects.  
  
Data 
The public funding information has been provided by the funding agency IWT and contains 
detailed information on the duration of the project, the total amount received and the type of 
subsidy scheme under which the subsidy had been granted.  
The data on firms’ research and development expenditures stem from the Flemish part of the 
OECD R&D survey. This survey composes the Main Science and Technology Indicators across 
OECD countries. In Flanders, the R&D survey draws from a permanent inventory of all R&D-
active firms. The OECD survey asks firms to split their total R&D expenditures into their R and 
D components. A guideline for respondents on how to attribute activities to R and D is provided 
by examples and definitions based on the Frascati manual. Beyond the budgets for R and D, the 
survey also contains rich information on other firm characteristics, like R&D employees, the group 
and ownership structure, subsidies from sources outside Flanders, and R&D collaborations. 
We combine the survey data and the funding information based on the firms’ unique VAT 
numbers. Our analysis makes use of five consecutive waves of the bi-annual survey covering the 
period from 2000 to 2009 and it comprises R&D-active firms from manufacturing and business-
related service sectors.  
We complemented the repeated cross-sectional survey data with patent statistics issued by the 
European Patent Office (EPO). The “EPO/OECD patent citations database” covers all patents 
applied for at the EPO since its foundation in 1978 as well as all patents applied for under the 
Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) in which the EPO is designated, so-called “Euro-PCT 
applications”. Data from the Belgian patent office serves as information about patents filed in 
Belgium only. Patent information is available as a time series from 1978 onward and has been 
collected by using text field search. We checked all potential hits of the text field search engine 
manually before merging it to the firm-level survey data. Finally, we collected the firms’ balance 
sheet information, in particular the firms’ tangible assets, from the Belfirst data base provided by 
Bureau van Dijk.  
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After the elimination of incomplete records, the final sample contains a total number of 4,442 
firm-year observations corresponding to 1,252 different firms. About 20% of these firms have 
benefitted from some type of IWT subsidy. Roughly five percent of the firms have reported the 
receipt of a subsidy from another funding source, such as the federal government or the EU during 
that time. Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics in terms of the grant distribution. While 
about 9% of the firms of our sample benefited from a development grant during the period under 
review, only 5.5% received a research grant. When considering exclusively subsidized firms, we 
see that on average 27% of the firms benefitted from a research grant, as compared to 44% 
receiving a development grant. In terms of grant size, the average annualized amount for a 
development grant among the recipient firms is close to 54 thousand Euros compared to 37 
thousand Euros for a research grant. As firms may hold multiple grants, the overall annualized 
amount is about 230 thousand among the grant recipients. The median is lower with about 83 
thousand Euros in a given year. 
 
Table 2: Within sample grant characteristics  
Variable Median Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Grant types all firms (N = 4442)     
Any-grant 0 0.201 0.401 0 1
Research grant 0 0.055 0.228 0 1
Development grant  0 0.090 0.286 0 1
 
Grant types of subsidy recipients (N = 893)    
Research grant 0 0.274 0.446 0 1
Development grant  0 0.448 0.498 0 1
Research grant (annual amount) 0 37.218 161.927 0 1940.826
Development grant (annual amount) 0 54.040 133.591 0 1558.176
Total amount yearly 82.959 230.253 501.666 0.938 4787.638
Note: amounts in thousands of Euros. Total grant size distributed over grant duration. 
 
 
Research and Development investment variables  
The outcome variables in the treatment effect estimation are firms’ R&D (as well as R and D) 
intensity, which are the ratios of R&D (respectively R and D) to sales, multiplied by 100. The total 
annual R and D expenditures are taken directly from the survey after the survey data been 
systematically checked for plausibility and consistency. As we have information on the subsidy 
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amounts received, we have constructed our outcome variables as net amounts of R and D spending. 
That is, we have deducted the annualized amount of the subsidy from the firms’ total R and D 
expenditures. We distributed the full amount of the grant equally over the years of duration of the 
project. For the baseline model, the subsidies of the mixed-scheme have been deducted 50% from 
‘R’ investment and 50% from ‘D’ investment.6  
 
Probability to receive subsidies 
We model the receipt of a subsidy by a dummy variable equal to one if a firm received financial 
support, zero otherwise. This yields three main explanatory variables: the receipt of any subsidy 
(SUB), a research project grant (Sr) and a development project grant (Sd). 
We control for other characteristics, likely to influence the receipt of either one of our two 
policy treatments. The number of employees takes into account possible size effects. Given that 
this variable is skewed, it enters the model as a natural logarithm (lnEMPL). We also allow for a 
potential non-linear relationship by including (lnEMPL2). We further include a dummy variable 
that is equal to one if a firm qualifies as a SME (SME).  Belgian SMEs are eligible for a higher 
subsidy rate than large-size firms, which may impact the likelihood of applying for, and hence, 
receiving a subsidy.7 The higher subsidy rate for SMEs can be received for any funding scheme 
and no difference is made between R or D projects. 
In addition, we include a dummy variable capturing whether or not a firm is part of an 
enterprise group with a foreign parent company (GP_FOREIGN). It is a-priori not clear whether 
belonging to a group with a foreign parent has a positive or negative influence in the receipt of a 
subsidy by the Flemish funding agency. Firms that belong to a group with a parent located in a 
different country may be less likely to apply for a subsidy in Belgium than other firms. In addition, 
firms having a large majority shareholder do not qualify for the Belgian SME programs in which 
                                                 
6Co-funded mixed projects are included in the treatment for “any scheme”. Given that we are mainly interested in the 
direct and cross effects of the research and the development grant schemes, we do not undertake a separate analysis 
for the mixed grant scheme. In order to perform our analyses on the net amount of our outcome variables, we do 
deduct the amounts of the mixed scheme grants from R&D (respectively ‘R’ and ‘D’) intensity. This ensures that our 
outcome variables are net of any type of grant and that we really only consider private investment in our outcome 
measures. 
Since we cannot be sure about the exact distribution of this scheme for both components, we re-estimated our findings 
using a 30/60 respectively 60/30 distribution as a robustness check (results are presented in Tables A.4 and A.5 of 
Appendix 3). 
7 SME follows the definition of the European Commission, according to which an SME should have less than 250 
employees and has either sales less than 50 million euros (or a balance sheet total of less than 43 million euros). 
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higher subsidy rates are attributed to recipient firms, giving them less incentives to apply. On the 
other hand, firms with a foreign parent company might enjoy a larger network and be better able 
to incur the application costs.   
The log of the firm’s age (lnAGE) is included in the analysis as older firms may have more 
experience than younger firms reducing their application costs. On the other hand, young firms are 
more likely to be financially constrained than older or more established firms are, and might 
therefore be more likely to apply for public support. Similar as for size, we allow for a non-linear 
relationship by included lnAGE2.  
We further control for whether a firm collaborated for its R&D activities (CO). Given the 
Belgian funding agency encourages firms to collaborate for the R&D activities (for both, R and D 
programs), being a collaborator may be an important determinant in receiving, and applying for, 
public support.  
R&D experience, especially if successful, may increase firms likelihood to apply again and to 
be granted a public subsidy. To capture these dynamics, we include the firms’ past patent stock in 
our regression. Patent stocks (PS) are computed as a time series of patent applications with a 15% 
rate of obsolescence of knowledge capital, as is common in the literature (see e.g. Griliches and 
Mairesse, 1984; Jaffe, 1986):  
                  , , 1 ,(1 )i t i t i tPS PS PATAPPL               (11) 
where PATAPPL is the number of patent applications in each year. The patent stock enters into 
the regression as patent stock per employee to avoid potential multicollinearity with firm size 
(PS/EMP). Just as past successful R&D projects might play an important role for the application 
and granting of a subsidy, experience with a specific funding scheme might drive the selection 
process. In order to consider this, we construct a dummy variable capturing if a firm had a 
subsidized project in the previous three years in any funding scheme. 
In addition, we include firms’ capital intensity in order to control for differences in the 
technologies used in the production process. Companies having a more capital-intensive 
production might rely more heavily on R&D than labour-intensive firms.  
Finally, sixteen industry dummies are included to control for unobserved heterogeneity and 
technological opportunity or appropriation across sectors (See Table A.2 of Appendix 2 for the 
distribution of firms across industries). Ten time dummies are included to capture macroeconomic 
shocks and changes in the policy design over years. 
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Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables of interest distinguishing between 
subsidized and non-subsidized firms. The latter serve as control group in our empirical analysis as 
these firms did not receive any grants, neither from the Flemish funding agency nor from any other 
funding source like for instance the national government or the European Union.8  
Subsidized firms, no matter which type of support they receive, have on average a higher 
net R&D intensity and this for both stages of R&D: research intensity as well as development 
intensity. Comparing the R versus D grant recipients reveals that the research grant-receiving firms 
have larger development intensities. This is already reminiscent of the complementary role 
research plays with regard to development.   
With respect to the control variables, we see that, on average, subsidized firms are 
significantly larger compared to non-subsidized firms. Likewise, subsidized firms have a 
significantly higher patent stock per employee and have received more often subsidies in previous 
years. Subsidized firms (irrespective of the scheme) further engage significantly more often in 
R&D collaboration. Comparing research and development grants recipients, we see that firms 
benefitting from research grants have on average a higher patent stock per employee and more 
experience with the research support scheme.     
 
 
 
                                                 
8 The information on funding sources other than IWT is obtained from the survey. Firms are explicitly asked to indicate 
regional, national and supranational funding sources for supported R&D projects. 
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Table 3: Detailed descriptive statistics by subsidy type     
   I II III IV I vs. II I vs. III I vs. IV III vs. IV 
  
Non-subsidized 
firms, N=3,549 
Subsidized firms, 
any type§, N=893 
`R' subsidized 
firms, N=245 
`D' subsidized 
firms, N=400 
 P-values of two-sided  
t-tests on mean differences of the 
groups of interest 
Variables Mean  Std.Dev. Mean  Std.Dev. Mean  Std.Dev.  Mean  Std.Dev.        
   Outcome variables   
R&D_intensity_net 0.064 0.152 0.149 0.246 0.176 0.269 0.147 0.247 p<0.000 p<0.000 p<0.000 p=0.162 
Development_intensity_net 0.031 0.088 0.058 0.119 0.086 0.157 0.050 0.110 p<0.000 p<0.000 p=0.001 p<0.000 
Research_intensity_net 0.033 0.102 0.091 0.187 0.089 0.181 0.097 0.194 p<0.000 p<0.000 p<0.000 p=0.568 
  Control variables   
R&D cooperation 0.319 0.466 0.702 0.458 0.686 0.465 0.650 0.478 p<0.000 p<0.000 p<0.000 p=0.192 
Patent stock per employee 0.017 0.087 0.047 0.131 0.054 0.133 0.035 0.088 p<0.000 p<0.000 p<0.000 p=0.048 
Past research grants 0.042 0.200 0.152 0.360 0.261 0.440 0.135 0.342 p<0.000 p<0.000 p<0.000 p<0.000 
Past development grants 0.060 0.238 0.163 0.370 0.180 0.385 0.260 0.439 p<0.000 p<0.000 p<0.000 p=0.116 
Past mixed grants 0.032 0.175 0.226 0.419 0.212 0.410 0.200 0.401 p<0.000 p<0.000 p<0.000 p=0.370 
Foreign group 0.225 0.418 0.243 0.429 0.196 0.398 0.195 0.397 p=0.256 p=0.273 p=0.157 p=0.744 
SME 0.841 0.366 0.738 0.440 0.808 0.395 0.770 0.421 p<0.000 p=0.210 p=0.001 p=0.531 
Employees 147.687 320.687 323.804 757.329 259.959 616.656 290.134 686.021 p<0.000 p=0.005 p<0.000 p=0.782 
Capital intensity 41.295 56.470 39.451 51.926 36.359 39.076 38.946 55.047 p=0.352 p=0.066 p=0.402 p=0.600 
Age 24.606 18.089 23.460 21.699 21.657 21.465 22.985 21.262 p=0.146 p=0.037 p=0.143 p=0.870 
Notes: §contains firms with mixed grants. 
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5. Empirical results  
5.1. The matching results 
Table 4 shows the results of the probit estimations on the likelihood to receive subsidies. This  
serves as basis for the propensity score matching. The first model predicts the probability of the 
receipt of any type of subsidy, ignoring the distinction between research grants and development 
grants. The second and third model differentiate between receiving a research and a development 
subsidy.  
 
Table 4: Probit estimations on probability of receiving any grant, a research or a 
development grant 
  
Any type of subsidy 
N=4,442 
Research subsidy 
N=4,338† 
Development subsidy
N=4,442 
          Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  
Std. 
Err. Coef.  Std. Err. 
Patent stock per 
employee 1.070 *** 0.226 0.642**  0.280 0.140  0.278 
Past research 
grants 0.494 *** 0.089 0.710*** 0.098 0.167 0.101 
Past development 
grants 0.412 *** 0.081 0.270*** 0.102 0.717*** 0.083 
Past mixed grants 0.833 *** 0.087 0.362*** 0.109 0.350*** 0.097 
Foreign group -0.015 * 0.065 -0.158*  0.094 -0.306*** 0.080 
R&D cooperation 0.781 *** 0.050 0.445*** 0.072 0.530*** 0.060 
SME 0.016 0.110 0.165  0.163 -0.018  0.132 
ln(Employees) 0.025 0.073 -0.109  0.099 -0.010 0.084 
ln(Employees)2 0.011 0.010 0.018  0.013 0.005 0.011 
Capital intensity 0.029 0.023 0.032  0.033 0.006  0.027 
Age -0.423 *** 0.141 -0.043  0.196 -0.233 0.166 
(Age)2 0.051 0.026 -0.016  0.037 0.023  0.031 
LR chi2(36) 917.49*** 247.73*** 364.95*** 
Joint signif of industry 
dummies chi2(15) 72.34*** 17.05 40.17*** 
Joint signif on time 
dummies chi2(9) 32.83*** 17.65** 38.09*** 
Notes: *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). All models contain a constant, industry 
and year dummies (not presented).  
“Any type of subsidy” includes research subsidies,  development subsidies and mixed grants. 
† We lose 104 observations in the estimation on the probability of receiving a research grant, as no firm in 
the pulp and paper industry received such a grant. 
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As can be seen from Table 4, past research, development and mixed grants significantly determine 
current subsidy receipts for any type of subsidy. When disentangling research subsidies versus 
development subsidies, the incumbency effect is much stronger within programs, but there are also 
cross-scheme incumbency effects, particularly from past development scheme experience into 
current research subsidy receipts. In terms of past research experience, the patent stock per 
employee only displays a significant impact for research (or any type of) grants, but not for 
development ones, confirming patent stock as signal of quality/success is particularly important 
for the more risky and uncertain research activities. Being part of a group with a foreign parent 
displays a negative impact on the receipt of any type of grant. Past R&D collaboration is highly 
significant in driving the selection into any type of subsidy scheme, showing the importance 
attributed to collaboration by the funding agency. Finally, we do not find any evidence that size 
matters for the selection into the program. It should be noted though that while the size variables 
are individually not significant in driving the selection into receiving a grant, they are jointly 
significant in terms of receiving any type of subsidy (chi2( 3) = 38.10***). When disentangling 
between subsidy schemes, the size variables are also jointly insignificant (chi2( 3) = 2.77 for 
research and chi2( 3) = 2.93 for development respectively). 
 
Table 5 presents the results of our matching estimation.9  We find positive additionality from any 
subsidy on all outcome variables of interest. This positive additionality from R&D grants on R&D 
(as well as ‘R’ and ‘D’) confirms previous findings. It is re-assuring to see that even though 
previous estimations were mainly based on gross amounts, we find similar results when using the 
net amounts. We can thus complement previous findings that rejected a total crowding-out by 
finding evidence allowing us to reject partial crowding-out. This is the case for the overall receipt 
of any subsidy as well as for the specific subsidy schemes.   
To further analyze our predictions in terms of direct and cross effects, we present in Table 
5 t-tests on mean difference between the average treatment effects across treatments. For research 
grants, we see a significant direct effect as well as a significant cross effect, and that both effects 
                                                 
9 In order to ensure a balanced matching for both subsidy schemes, we use the log of firm size as an additional matching 
criterion when estimating the effect of the development subsidy scheme. As explained in the previous section and 
found by previous theoretical papers, development is often done primarily by larger firms. This is also the case in our 
data, where development subsidies were predominantly received by larger firms. This had thus to be taken into account 
to make sure that adequate neighbors could be found for the estimation of our control group.  
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are of similar size (confirming Hypotheses 1 and 4). Indeed, as shown by the t-test, the difference 
is not statistically significant. In terms of the impact of development subsidies, the picture looks 
different. While there is also a direct as well as a cross effect.  This confirms Hypotheses 2 and 4.  
Interestingly, the cross effect from D to R is significantly higher than the direct effect from D to 
D as shown by the t-test on mean difference.  
Looking at the magnitude of the treatment effects, it turns out that in line with our 
Hypothesis 3, the direct effect from R to R (0.031 percentage point increase in research intensity) 
is larger than the direct effect from D to D (0.014 percentage points increase in development 
intensity).      
When analyzing the impact of both subsidy types on research intensity, we see that the 
effect from a research grant on research expenditures (0.031) is lower than the impact triggered by 
the development grant (0.055). Based on the t-test on mean difference, we can conclude that this 
difference is not statistically significant though. Likewise, when comparing the impact of both 
types of grants on development intensity, we find that the difference is not statistically significant. 
 
Table 5: Matching results10         
  Outcome variables            
  Net R&D intensity 
Net 
Research 
intensity 
Net 
Development 
intensity 
T-test on mean difference 
Treatment       I vs. II III vs. IV I vs. III  
II vs. 
IV 
Any subsidy 
(N=701) 0.062*** 0.045*** 0.017***    
Research subsidy 
(N=198) 
0.070*** 
 
0.031** 
(I) 
0.038***  
(II) p=0.733   p=0.214 p=0.131Development 
subsidy (N=319)  
0.069*** 
 
0.055*** 
(III) 
0.014*  
(IV)    p=0.006
Notes: *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). Only outcome variables are 
presented as control variables are all balanced after the matching. 
 
 
                                                 
10 As shown by the overall significance of the probit after the matching, the matching was balanced in all three cases. The test 
statistic reads as follows for the three cases under review: Wald Chi2(36) = 16.03, Prob > Chi2  = 0.998 for the case of any subsidy, 
Wald Chi2(35) = 9.95, Prob > Chi2  = 1.00 for the case of a research subsidy and Wald Chi2(36) = 18.72 (Prob > Chi2  = 0.992) for 
case of receiving a development grants. 
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In terms of the policy trend outlined in the previous section and as could be gathered from Figure 
2, we observe a policy shift from supporting mixed projects towards targeted R and D support as 
of around 2005 onwards. When we compare the average treatment effect in the period prior 2005 
to the one afterwards (Table 6), we indeed find that the average treatment resulting from any 
subsidy is higher under the targeted regime, i.e. with R and D grants rather than supporting mixed 
projects. In particular, we find an average treatment effect (ATT) equal to 0.044 for the period 
until 2004 and an average treatment effect (ATT) equal to 0.078 for the post-2005 period. The 
difference is statistically significant (Pr(T<t) = 0.042).  When we test which component of R&D 
had benefited from the policy shift, we find that research intensities increased more than 
development. Although we find both effects to be higher in the more recent period, the difference 
is only significant for research intensities.   
 
Table 6: Matching results by period 
Treatment Outcome variables 
  Net R&D intensity Net Research intensity 
Net Development 
intensity 
  2000-2004 
Any subsidy 0.044*** 0.030*** 0.014 
 2005-2009 
Any subsidy 0.078*** 0.058*** 0.020*** 
                                          T-test on ATT difference 
Pr(T<t) 0.042** 0.028** 0.310 
Notes: *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%).  
 
5.2.Robustness check: Potential selection on unobservables  
Given that the matching estimator only controls for the selection on observables, we test whether 
the main conclusions change if we account for a potential selection on unobservables. In order to 
do so, we estimate instrumental variable regressions. Given that the receipt of a research subsidy 
might depend on different criteria than the receipt of development subsidies, we constructed 
separate instruments for either one type of treatment.  
We instrument the receipt of a research grant by two variables, namely the mean number 
of supported research projects by industry, size class and year and a variable capturing whether 
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the firm was previously engaged in collaboration that aimed at knowledge transfer. The rationale 
behind the former is that the more research projects supported within a certain industry and size 
class, the higher the likelihood that a firm i within this industry and size class may receive a grant. 
However, R&D intensity of firm i is not affected by the sector and size averages of this type of 
grant. The rationale behind the second variable is that firms engaging in collaboration which the 
aim of knowledge transfer may be more inclined to build on the knowledge acquired through this 
collaboration by engaging further into research in order to implement the knowledge into its own 
research projects in the future. As a consequence, the likelihood of applying (and hence receiving) 
a grant might be higher for these firms. 
We instrument the receipt of a development grant by three variables. The first is the mean 
number of supported development projects by industry, size class, and year. The rationale behind 
this instrument is the same as the one presented for the research grants. In addition, we use 
previously supported development projects (three-year-lag) as a measure for experience with the 
funding scheme and the type of project. Third, we use collaboration with suppliers by year and 
and type of ownership structure (i.e. is it a domestic firm or foreign owned firm), as both these 
characteristics might drive the selection into applying as well as into receiving a development 
grant. All five instrumental variables pass the standard criteria of relevance and exogeneity. The 
results from the two-stage least squares regressions are presented in Table 7. As can be gathered 
from the subsidy coefficients, our previous conclusions hold. The direct effect of a research grant 
is positive and significant, and larger than the direct effect of a development grant on development 
spending. In line with our previous findings, we find that the cross effect from D to R is larger 
than the direct effect from D to D. 
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Table 7: Instrumental variable regressions, N=4,442 
  Direct effects Cross effects 
Treatment:                             Research grant Development grant Research grant Development grant 
Outcome variable: net research intensity 
net development 
intensity 
net development 
intensity 
net research 
intensity 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
ln(research grant+1)              0.488 ***         0.563 *** 
                                           (0.108)             (0.171)     
ln(development grant+1)           0.347 *** 0.443 ***     
                                                (0.084)     (0.058)         
R&D Collaboration   1.326 *** 0.998 *** 1.277 *** 0.993 *** 
                                           (0.112)     (0.121)     (0.108)     (0.125)     
Patent stock/employee          0.953 *   1.769 *** 1.233 **  1.41 **  
                                           (0.498)     (0.571)     (0.508)     (0.609)     
Foreign Parent             0.151     0.314 *   0.212     0.28     
                                           (0.171)     (0.177)     (0.169)     (0.175)     
ln(employees)                       0.457 *** 0.413 **  0.469 *** 0.404 **  
                                           (0.161)     (0.162)     (0.160)     (0.157)     
ln(employees)2                      0.02     0.035 *   0.017     0.035 *   
                                           (0.020)     (0.021)     (0.020)     (0.020)     
ln(capital intensity)               0.164 *** 0.004     0.174 *** -0.007     
                                           (0.051)     (0.056)     (0.050)     (0.055)     
ln(age)                                   -0.229     -0.236     -0.167     -0.255     
                                           (0.308)     (0.338)     (0.298)     (0.327)     
ln(age)2                                  0.012     0.037     0.003     0.042     
                                           (0.058)     (0.063)     (0.056)     (0.061)     
Constant                                1.767 *** 1.074 *   1.673 *** 1.046 **  
                                           (0.505)     (0.550)     (0.491)     (0.527)     
F-test of excluded 
instruments 20.13 *** 23.24 *** 23.24 *** 20.13 *** 
Hansen J overidentification 
test 0.1203  0.123  0.339  1.88  
Joint significance of year 
dummies chi2(9) 144.49 *** 70.73 *** 122.67 *** 100.14 *** 
Joint significance of 
industry dummies chi2(15) 109.93 *** 103.08 *** 108.2 *** 69.93 *** 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
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5.3.The dose response function (DRF) results 
While the matching analysis allowed us to conclude that on average, the treatment effect is 
positive, the dose response function allows us to see whether the size of the subsidy matters in 
terms of net investment. The estimated DRF on expected net expenditures by level of treatment is 
shown in Figure 3. The subsidy amounts as well as the outcome variables are in logs so that the 
slope of the DRF is the elasticity of R and D spending with respect to the subsidy. On the left hand 
side, the graphs show the direct effects and on the right hand sides the cross effects.  
For research grants, increasing the treatment level corresponds to lower levels of expected 
research investments for the first third of the treatment distribution. From that threshold onwards, 
an additional unit of the subsidy leads to a higher level of net investment. Only for the very high 
treatment levels, the relationship inverses again. As can be gathered from the graphs, the DRFs 
based on research grants as treatment show quite comparable patterns for the direct and cross 
effect, the latter being slightly flatter. This was to be expected given that we saw in the previous 
section that on average, the impact of a research grant is similar for R and for D expenditures. In 
both cases, the linear model would have predicted a positive relationship for all values of the 
treatment, while the DRF suggest that the positive effects prevail mostly in the area of larger 
subsidy amounts.   
For development, the elasticity is low for grants smaller than the mean, but increases 
afterwards. Again, cross and direct effects follow a similar pattern. In all four cases, at the mean 
value of the subsidy amounts (vertical line), the elasticity is positive, meaning that an increase in 
the subsidy amount is associated with an increase in net spending. Overall, the dose response 
analysis seems to suggest an effective minimum subsidy amount and that – as long as the dose is 
not too large – an increase in the subsidy amount does translate into additional net spending by the 
recipient firms. 
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Figure 3: Estimated dose-response functions (direct and cross scheme) 
 
 
5.4. Heterogeneity in the treatment effect 
Not all firms may respond to the receipt of a subsidy in the same way. Table 8 shows the share of 
negative individual treatment effects, the share of positives and the share of treatment effects equal 
to zero. Given the considerable variation in the individual treatment effect, it is interesting to look 
at which firm attributes may impact the size of the treatment effects. Firms may be more likely to 
increase their investments once additional financing becomes available if they had put projects on 
the shelf due to a lack of financing. Since especially young small and medium sized firms may 
face financing constraints leading to shelved projects (e.g. Czarnitzki and Hottenrott 2011a; 
Cincera et al. 2014), one may expect a larger average treatment effect for these firms.  
We estimate correlations between firm age and firm size and the direct and cross effects using 
OLS. We consider a firm to be young if it has been founded less than 7 years ago and small if it 
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employees 50 or fewer employees. A firm is of medium size if it has more than 50 but less than 
250 employees. We are also interested in the interaction effect between small and young. We 
control for industry affiliation and the (annualized) grant size. The estimation equation is: 
    
0 1 2 3 4
19
5
6
ln(  ) ( ) ( ) ( )
              ( ) ( ) ,
TT
i i
i
grant amount young small young small
medium ind
     
  
     
                   (12) 
Table 9 summarizes the results. For research grants, grant size positively affects the size of 
the direct treatment effect, but the effect is not particularly strong at the mean as the DRF analysis 
already suggested. Medium sized firms have a direct effect of research grants on research intensity 
that is about 7% larger than that of larger firms. While we do not find any significant effects for 
firm age, we find that young and small firms show a significant higher cross effect from R to D 
(22.3%). These results suggest that research grants facilitate additional development spending in 
these firms. For development grants, we find none of the firm characteristics to explain the direct 
treatment effect. For the cross effect on research, however, we find again that medium sized firms 
are associated with significantly higher cross effects, about 6% higher on average.  
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Table 8: Heterogeneity of direct and cross effects 
  
Research grant  
N= 198 
Development grant 
N=319 
  
direct 
effect 
cross- 
effect 
direct  
effect 
cross- 
effect 
Mean 0.031 0.038 0.014 0.055
Median 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.008
% <0  43.430 38.890 44.514 33.229
% = 0 6.060 3.530 9.404 3.135
% >0 50.510 57.580 46.082 63.636
 
Table 9: OLS regressions on the impact of size and age on the individual treatment effect αTTi	
treatment Research grant   Development grant 
dependent variable  
αi (net 
research 
intensity) 
αi (net 
development 
intensity) 
αi (net 
development 
intensity) 
αi (net research 
intensity) 
grant amount (annualized) 0.030* 0.003 -0.008 -0.002 
 (0.015) (0.011) (0.011) (0.019) 
young -0.046 -0.005 0.033 -0.039 
 (0.074) (0.069) (0.028) (0.034) 
small 0.017 -0.010 -0.014 0.034 
 (0.038) (0.027) (0.011) (0.027) 
young X small 0.017 0.223*** -0.047 0.039 
 (0.098) (0.079) (0.053) (0.087) 
medium 0.069** 0.028 0.011 0.060** 
 (0.034) (0.027) (0.014) (0.024) 
N 198 198 319 319 
Joint sign. of industries 1.84** 1.12 0.98 1.96** 
Overall significance 2.42*** 3.59*** 1.44** 1.95** 
Note: standard errors are robust. 13 industry dummies included. 
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6. Conclusions 
This study analyzes how subsidies for research and development affect the net investment levels 
for these activities. Studying a data set with information on the grants and their recipients, we first 
find that public grants increase net R&D spending, on average, thus allowing us to reject the 
hypotheses of total as well as partial crowding out. Our findings refine previous insights by 
showing that research grants yield a higher average additionality than development grants. Second, 
we find that research and development subsidies not only trigger direct but also cross effects. While 
we find that development subsidies have a relative small direct effect on net development 
expenditures, they stimulate research expenditures. Research subsidies on the other hand spur own 
research as well as development, and this to a similar extent.  
These results point to two phenomena. On the one hand, the direct effect may be larger for research 
grants, because research investments are more uncertain, more risky, more costly to finance and 
their results may be more difficult to appropriate. If firms for these reasons do not pursue research 
projects in absence of a subsidy, they may do so if a significant share is covered by a grant. For 
development projects, the market failures are less severe and a subsidy may therefore not have the 
same “additionality power”. The significant cross-effect from a development grant on research 
activities may, however, point to the fact that the additional funding facilitates additional research 
project by allowing the firm’s budget to shift from development to the more constrained research 
activities. The complementarity between research and development may explain the cross-effect 
that we observe from research grants on development activities. If a research subsidy facilitates 
additional research, this may also enable the firm to further pursue their product or process 
development at a larger scale. Analyzing the heterogeneity in the individual firm treatment effects 
shows that this cross effect is especially high for young and small firms.   
Based on these findings, we can conclude that even though both subsidy schemes affect 
both parts of the R&D process, targeting subsidies to the research and development stage increased 
the overall amount of R&D invested in the economy.   We further find that the dose matters: as 
long as the grant size is not excessive, larger doses generate higher additionality effects, both direct 
and cross-scheme.     
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Based on these findings, a major policy implication seems to be that specific schemes that take 
into account the peculiarities of the different components of the R&D process may increase 
efficiency of public co-funding programs. The results also encourage supporting projects in the 
early stages of R&D activities. These results should raise policy makers’ awareness that 
development subsidies may have an effect on the type of activity that is relatively more likely to 
be affected by market failure. Supporting research projects in young and small firms may not only 
yield direct effects on the firms’ research intensities, but also translate into additional development 
projects.  
We strongly encourage further research on the efficacy of policy schemes in different 
environments in order to assess the generalizability of the insights gained in this study.  
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Appendices  
Appendix 1: Detailed Matching Protocol 
Table A.1: The matching protocol11  
Step 1 Specify and estimate a probit model to obtain the propensity score  Pˆ X .  
Step 2 Restrict the sample to common support: delete all observations on treated firms with probabilities larger 
than the maximum and smaller than the minimum in the potential control group. This step is also 
performed for other covariates that are possibly used in addition to the propensity score as matching 
arguments. In our case, industry classification and year for instance. This variant is called hybrid 
matching (see Lechner, 1998). Furthermore, for the case of development grants, we use firm size as an 
additional criteria. 
Step 3 Choose one observation from the subsample of treated firms and delete it from that pool. 
Step 4 Calculate the Mahalanobis distance between this firm and all non-subsidized firms in order to find the 
most similar control observation.    ' 1ij j i j iMD Z Z Z Z     
where   is the empirical covariance matrix of the matching arguments based on the sample of potential 
controls. 
We use caliper matching, first introduced by Cochran and Rubin (1973). The intuition of caliper 
matching is to avoid “bad” matches (those for which the value of the matching argument Zj is far from 
Zi) by imposing a threshold of the maximum distance allowed between the treated and the control group. 
That is, a match for firm i is only chosen if ||Zj – Zi|| < ԑ, where ԑ is a pre-specified tolerance. 
 
Step 5 Select the observation with the minimum distance from the remaining control group. (Do not remove 
the selected controls from the pool of potential controls, so that it can be used again.) If the control 
group is empty after applying the caliper threshold, the treated firm is dropped from the sample and is 
not taken into account in the evaluation. 
Step 6 Repeat steps 3 to 5 for all observations on subsidized firms. 
Step 7 Using the matched comparison group, the average effect on the treated can thus be calculated as the 
mean difference of the matched samples:  
 
ߙො்் ൌ 	 1்݊ ൭෍ ௜்ܻ௜
െ෍ పܻ஼෢
௜
൱ 
 
with పܻ஼෢  being the counterfactual for i and nT is the sample size (of treated firms). 
Step 8 As we perform sampling with replacement to estimate the counterfactual situation, an ordinary t-statistic 
on mean differences is biased, because it does not take the appearance of repeated observations into 
account. Therefore, we have to correct the standard errors in order to draw conclusions on statistical 
inference. We follow Lechner (2001) and calculate his estimator for an asymptotic approximation of 
the standard errors. 
 
  
                                                 
11 The matching protocol follows Gerfin and Lechner (2002). 
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Appendix 2: Industry and size class distribution 
Table A.2: Industry distribution 
Industr NACE (rev. 2008) Description Frequenc %
1 10, 11, 12 Food and Tobacco 365 8.22
2 13, 14, 15 Textiles, Clothing and Leather 261 5.88
3 16, 31 Wood and Furniture 113 2.54
4 17, 18 Paper 104 2.34
5 19, 20 Chemicals 330 7.43
6 21 Pharmaceuticals 81 1.82
7 22 Rubber and Plastic 201 4.52
8 24, 25, 33 Metal 329 7.41
9 27, 28 Machines and Equipment 579 13.03
10 26 ICT 247 5.56
11 29, 30 Transport 114 2.57
12 41 Building and Construction 92 2.07
13 1, 5, 23, 37, 35, 32 Miscellaneous Industries 280 6.30
14 45, 46, 47, 49, 55, 58 Commerce and Transport 291 6.55
15 59, 64, 68, 69, 71 -
79
Other Services 607 13.67
16 61, 62 Software Development and     Communication 448 10.09 
   4,442 100.00
 
 
Table A.3: Firm size classes 
Size definition Variable name Frequency %
1 < 20 empl. Tiny 1,260 28.37
2 ≥ 20 & < 50 Small 1,053 23.71
3 ≥ 50 & < 100 Medium small 610 13.73
4 ≥ 100 & < 250 Medium 720 16.21
5 ≥ 250  Large 799 17.99
 4,442 100.00
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
Appendix 3: Robustness check: Additionality for a different distribution of the 
mixed subsidy scheme 
 
 
Table A.4: Matching results (only outcome variables are presented) (33.3% of the  
mixed scheme is deducted from research expenditures, 66.6% of development  
expenditures)                                   
  Outcome variables 
  Net R&D intensity 
Net Research 
intensity 
Net Development 
intensity 
Treatment       
Any subsidy  0.049*** 0.037*** 0.012* 
Research subsidy  0.070*** 0.029** 0.041*** 
Development subsidy  0.047*** 0.041*** 0.006 
Notes: *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). Only outcome 
variables are presented as control variables are all balanced after the matching. 
 
 
Table A.5: Matching results (only outcome variables are presented) (33.3% of 
the mixed scheme is deducted from development expenditures, 66.6% of 
research expenditures) 
  Outcome variables 
  Net R&D intensity 
Net Research 
intensity 
Net Development 
intensity 
Treatment       
Any subsidy  0.050*** 0.037*** 0.013** 
Research subsidy  0.068*** 0.026* 0.042*** 
Development subsidy  0.040** 0.038*** 0.003 
Notes: *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). Only outcome 
variables are presented as control variables are all balanced after the matching. 
 
 
 
